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THE EFFECT OF THE WARRANTY OF HABITABILITY ON
LOW INCOME HOUSING: "MILKING" AND CLASS
VIOLENCE
DUNCAN KENNEDY*
Housing for the poor suffers in quantity and quality as tenement
landlords "milk" still viable buildings, allowing them to deterio-
rate and become uninhabitable at a rate that outstrips construc-
tion of new housing. As a result, the rate at which the poor filter
up into higher quality buildings slows, crowding low income te-
nants into fewer, more run down buildings. Professor Kennedy
postulates that selective enforcement of a warranty of habitabil-
ity can maximize the useful lives of tenement buildings, and,
contrary to the "mainstream" view, exert downward pressure on
rents while increasing the supply of low income housing.
N THIS Article I argue that enforcement of a nondisclaimable
warranty of habitability in leases of low income urban housing
might, under particular market and institutional circumstances,
benefit low income tenants at the expense of their landlords. This
thesis is controversial. As Edward Rabin1 recently put it, the
"mainstream" view among writers on housing law is that the en-
forcement of a warranty of habitability will hurt tenants as a class,
including low income tenants. I believe that the mainstream view
is wrong, at least as far as one can tell on the basis of plausible
assumptions and generally accepted analyses of the low income
market.
* Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. An earlier version of this paper was first deliv-
ered as the Mason Ladd Memorial Lecture at the Florida State University College of Law
on November 6, 1986. Thanks to Matt Drennan, Louis Kaplow, Susan Rose-Ackerman, Paul
Shupack and Bill Whitford. Errors are mine alone.
1. Rabin, The Revolution in Residential Landlord-Tenant Law: Causes and Conse-
quences, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 517, 558 (1984).
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The "dissident" view, according to Rabin,2 is that of Bruce Ack-
erman and Richard Markovits I start from different assumptions
and reach somewhat different conclusions, but my analysis is based
on their work, which I see as the most important contribution to
the field to date.
My argument is as follows: According to the "filtering model" of
low income housing supply, poor people are likely to live in neigh-
borhoods where building values are declining, even when housing
conditions are improving. Under conventional neo-classical
microeconomic assumptions, we would expect landlords to un-
dermaintain, or "milk," buildings in declining slum neighborhoods.
The degree of undermaintenance is theoretically indeterminate.
Enforcing a code or warranty should prevent it, prolong building
life, and increase housing supply. Contrary to the conclusions of
"mainstream" analysis, the effect of comprehensive code or war-
ranty enforcement on the price and quantity of slum housing is
therefore indeterminate. Selective enforcement could increase sup-
ply more than it decreases it, and depress rent levels for the poor.
Institutional conditions make it likely that slum landlords will
sometimes seriously rather than trivially undermaintain, and that
neighborhood effects will amplify individual landlord decisions into
large scale trends. Selective warranty enforcement against "milk-
ers" is at least worth experiment, in neighborhoods where the
model suggests it is likely to work.
I. THE FILTERING MODEL
No new housing, or very little, is currently built for poor people
in urban areas. It has long been the case that new housing becomes
available to the poor through trickle down, otherwise known as the
filtering process. As higher income people build new housing for
themselves in the suburbs, lower income people "filter up" through
the existing stock, so that today's poor often live in housing built
for an earlier middle class.'
2. Id. at 559-61.
3. Ackerman, Regulating Slum Housing Markets On Behalf of the Poor: Of Housing
Codes, Housing Subsidies and Income Redistribution Policy, 80 YALE L. 1093 (1971).
4. Markovits, The Distributive Impact, Allocative Efficiency, and Overall Desirability
of Ideal Housing Codes: Some Theoretical Clarifications, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1815 (1976).
5. See generally HOUSING IN AMERICA: PROBLEMS AND PERSPECTIVES 161-203 (R. Mont-
gomery & D. Mandelker 2d ed. 1979) [hereinafter Montgomery & Mandelker] (discussing
filtering in general); W. GRIGSBY, HOUSING MARKETS AND PUBLIC POLICY 84-130 (1963).
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The filtering process involves steady decline in the value of ex-
isting housing, as new housing is built and lower income people
move upward through the neighborhood chain. The reason for this,
within the model, is that the new occupant of a given unit has
lower income than the departing occupant, and should therefore
offer less for that unit at any given amenity level. Because the unit
commands less rent at a given level of maintenance expenditure, it
generates less cash flow, and therefore has a lower capital value.
Maintenance also declines, because new residents will not pay as
many dollars as older residents, out of their smaller incomes, for a
given level of amenity. But, the new residents should still be get-
ting more amenity for those dollars than they did in the older and
less desirable structures they lived in before. Otherwise, they
would not move.7
If filtering is working right, the number of functioning units
should grow no faster than the population (assuming constant
preferences about household composition), but the composition of
the stock should improve. There should be abandonment and con-
version to nonresidential uses, corresponding to new construction,
but only of housing that is so bad that, given the alternatives filter-
ing down, no one can be found to rent it. (Much of the housing
already abandoned through filtering lacked indoor plumbing, elec-
tricity, running water, central heating, and so forth.)
If the middle and upper classes build themselves new housing
faster than old housing is abandoned or converted, the model sug-
gests that the rent for buildings at the very end of the chain will
eventually decline to a level that reflects only the price of ongoing
maintenance (plus taxes) and premiums for good location. In other
words, the Ricardian quasi-rent for the structures themselves
should decline to zero. Unmaintained housing, albeit the least de-
sirable then in the stock, should be a free good, and its quality
should increase steadily over time.
The reason for this is that landlords at the end of the chain have
no bargaining power with tenants, other than for the provision of
maintenance and location. A landlord who tried to charge rents
6. See generally Montgomery & Mandelker, supra note 5, at 162-172 (excerpt from W.
SMITH, FILTERING AND NEIGHBORHOOD CHANGE 17-33 (1964)).
7. See generally Montgomery & Mandelker, supra note 5, at 172-79 (excerpt from Edel,
Filtering in a Private Housing Market, in READINGS IN URBAN ECONOMICS 204-15 (1972)).
8. A quasi-rent is a return to a factor that is in temporarily fixed supply but whose
quantity can be increased over the long run. A true rent, by contrast, is a return to a factor
like location or natural soil fertility whose quantity is just given.
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that reflected more than maintenance (and location) would lose his
tenants to the competition from the new units filtering down. As
between similarly situated units available at the bottom, tenants
should choose those that deliver the greatest amenity for the least
maintenance cost.
Lower rents and cheaper home ownership opportunities in the
neighborhoods into which the poor are moving should, according to
the model, be at the expense of those long time owners in the area
who decide to stay put.9 There are, however, strategies by which
landlords caught in the downward chain reaction can minimize the
losses allocated to them by filtering, and these involve shifting the
losses to incoming and older tenants, and to banks.
If the rate of abandonment and conversion at the end of the
chain is equal to or greater than the rate of new construction at the
top of the chain (minus units absorbed by increased demand of the
middle and lower middle class before they reach the bottom), then
the stock of units available to the poor will remain constant or de-
crease.10 Landlords at the bottom will be able to charge rents that
reflect the scarcity of units (quasi-rents) as well as location and
maintenance costs.
Where that is the case, the poor receive the level of amenity they
can afford, but only after they have subtracted from their incomes
the part of their rent which reflects the scarcity of buildings. (This
is the basic Henry George point.)" As a matter of fact, low income
rents generally reflect substantial scarcity payments, as is evident
from the fact that dilapidated buildings in slums have positive
market value. One of the factors that counteracts the growth in
supply of housing at the bottom of the chain is the landlord behav-
ior known as milking to abandonment.
What follows is a model of landlord maintenance decisions in a
declining neighborhood. The idea is to show that the behavior of a
rational landlord facing decline may be socially undesirable, in a
way that we might be able to cure by enforcing the warranty of
habitability.
9. Montgomery & Mandelker, supra note 5, at 174-76.
10. On abandonment in general, see G. STERNLIEB & R. BURCHELL, RESIDENTIAL ABAN-
DONMENT: THE TENEMENT LANDLORD REVISITED (1973); J. HEILBRUN, URBAN ECONOMICS AND
PUBLIC POLICY 355-58 (1981); Rasmussen & Struyk, A Housing Strategy for the City of
Detroit: Policy Perspectives Based on Economic Analysis, in PERSPECTIVES ON LOCAL PUB-
LIC FINANCE AND PUBLIC POLICY 151-93 (J. Quigley ed. 1983).
11. H. GEORGE, PROGRESS AND POVERTY (1879).
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II. DEFINITION OF MILKING
The specific landlord behavior involved I call "milking." I mean
by milking the decision to reduce maintenance below the level nec-
essary to keep a building in existence as a residential unit.12 In
other words, the milking landlord treats his property as a wasting
rather than a renewable asset. He adopts a strategy of renting for
what the market will bear as the building deteriorates, fully under-
standing that within some relatively short period of time he will be
out of business. Either tenants will no longer pay him anything, or
the authorities will close the building. At that point, he expects the
building to have no market value. He will walk away from it, give
it away, or lose it to tax foreclosure.
Take the longtime owner with no mortgage debt and small hold-
ings in the area. Suppose he is taken by surprise when decline sets
in, and does not sell until the value of his property has fallen
sharply, reflecting the common expectation that rents have begun
an irreversible decline. The new tenants moving in (and old ones as
well) are willing and able to pay rents that would maintain the
area at a marginally lower level than when the departing affluent
were there, but it does not follow that it is rational for the landlord
to provide this service.
He faces a trade-off. Cutting back maintenance will lead to a
shorter life for the asset and reduce the rent he can charge, but it
will also reduce current outlays. What is the right solution for
him? It depends on how rapidly rental income will decline if he
continues to maintain at the old level, on how sensitive rents will
be to declines in amenity if he decides to cut back maintenance,
and on how fast the building will deteriorate for a given reduction
in maintenance.
Suppose the landlord expects rents to decline very quickly no
matter what he does, that they will not decline much faster if he
12. Lowry, Filtering and Housing Standards: A Conceptual Analysis, 36 LAND EcoN.
362-70 (1960) is the closest thing to the analysis in this section that I have found in the
literature. An important assumption in the discussion that follows is that age per se is not
an important factor in abandonment, contrary to the intuitive notion that all buildings will
eventually be abandoned when they "wear out." Lowry argues that age leads to technical
and stylistic obsolescence, which reduces demand for the unit, sometimes so far that it is
abandoned. The physical aging process just means that the owner must spend money on
maintenance in order to keep the unit in the stock. If demand is great enough, maintenance
will replace every part of the unit that deteriorates, and most buildings will stay in the stock
indefinitely. Different buildings may have different physical aging patterns and require dif-
ferent quantities of maintenance, but for any given unit the question of abandonment is
economically rather than physically determined. Id. at 365-66.
1987]
490 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 15:485
reduces amenity, and that he can keep going at low or zero mainte-
nance for a long time before he loses the building. Under these
conditions, it may be a rational investment strategy to stop or re-
duce maintenance and let the building gradually deteriorate to-
ward abandonment. This is milking, a maintenance strategy that
treats the building as a wasting asset rather than an indefinitely
renewable long-term investment.
III. WHEN IS MILKING RATIONAL?
The case that I am going to deal with is that of the landlord who
wants to reduce maintenance below the renewable level before rent
falls so low that he has no other choice. In other words, I am going
to argue that it will sometimes be rational for a landlord to begin
to milk a building before the rent roll has fallen so far that rent
will not cover maintenance (plus taxes, insurance, and a normal
profit). And I am going to argue that it would be a good idea to
enforce the warranty of habitability to prevent this behavior.
It is easy to see why a slum landlord milks a building when the
exodus of more affluent tenants filtering up and out has driven
rent down so far that keeping the building viable would put him in
the red. Likewise, it is easy to see that a stable low income neigh-
borhood might be abandoned through milking if the income of
long-term tenants declined far enough (due to a reduction in wel-
fare payments, for example). But where rent will cover mainte-
nance (plus taxes, insurance, and a normal profit), it would seem
the landlord is hurting his own interests if he in effect destroys his
property by undermaintenance.
Imagine that we know how much a tenant will pay for the unit
kept in renewable shape, and how much a tenant will pay for it if
the landlord stops maintenance and the unit begins to deteriorate.
So long as this rent premium for amenity is greater than the cost
of providing it, we assume that profit-maximizing landlords will
not milk. They will go on maintaining in order to maximize their
income from the building. But now suppose that as the neighbor-
hood deteriorates there comes a time when tenants will not pay a
premium for the maintained premises equal to the cost to the
landlord of keeping them that way. The landlord will at least con-
sider stopping maintenance payments since those payments no
longer generate a concomitant increase in rent.
But if he stops maintaining, he will lose his investment when the
building becomes uninhabitable or is condemned by the city.
Moreover, each monthly rent payment will be smaller for the un-
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maintained premises, though the decrease will not be as great as
the savings on maintenance. In other words, maintenance does not
increase monthly income by as much as it costs, but it does pre-
vent loss of a future income stream and earns back a part of its
cost. The landlord will have to offset the gains from milking (gen-
erated by the suspension of maintenance payments) against these
losses (reduction of the monthly payments for now less desirable
premises, and reduction in the longevity of the income stream).
The income lost through milking should, under conventional ec-
onomic assumptions, become less and less as the neighborhood de-
clines. First, the difference between rent payments for the building
maintained and for the building unmaintained should become
smaller and smaller. This follows from the conventional assump-
tion that poorer and poorer tenants will offer a smaller and smaller
premium for any given quantity of amenity. In other words, imag-
ine that a family with a $15,000 per year income will offer $400 per
month for the landlord's premises if they are deteriorating toward
abandonment, and an additional $100 per month if the landlord is
maintaining at the renewable level.
If family income falls to $10,000, the family could only offer, say,
$300 per month for deteriorating premises, and a premium of $75
for the same apartment maintained. This means that as the neigh-
borhood declines, the landlord foregoes less and less monthly in-
come when he decides on a given cutback of maintenance.
Second, as the neighborhood deteriorates, the value of the in-
come stream the landlord will have to forego if he abandons be-
comes smaller and smaller. Imagine that if the landlord main-
tained at the renewable level, he would have eleven years of
(declining) income before rent payments became so small they
would not cover maintenance (plus taxes, insurance, and normal
profit). Let us say that at that point (eleven years) it would make
sense for him to stop maintenance altogether, and just collect mar-
ginal rent until he lost the building, after, say, another four years.
Under the best of circumstances, the life of the building is only
fifteen years from the start of neighborhood decline.
Now imagine that he starts milking as soon as neighborhood de-
cline confronts him with falling rent, and as a result, he loses the
building after four years. He has foregone eleven years of (declin-
ing) rent payments. But for each year he delays the start of milk-
ing, the foregone income stream is one year shorter. Thus if he
starts milking after six years of declining rent, and it still takes
four years for the building to leave the stock (at the ten year
19871
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mark), he foregoes only five years of rental income, years in which
the unit would have commanded relatively little anyway.
As the neighborhood deteriorates and the building approaches
the eleven-year mark (at which the landlord is sure to stop main-
taining, we suppose, because rent payments have gone through the
floor), the savings from eliminating maintenance decline. The land-
lord who milks prematurely in year ten saves only a year's expense.
But the gains from maintaining become smaller faster, as the ten-
ant premium for amenity declines, and the foregone income stream
becomes shorter and shorter, approaching zero. At some point
before year eleven, the gains from milking must exceed the gains
from maintaining, and at that point a rational landlord will let the
building go down.
IV. GRAPHICAL ILLUSTRATION OF THE RATIONALITY OF MILKING
In this section, I will illustrate graphically the conclusion that,
under the assumptions I have been making, there must come a
time, before rent falls below maintenance cost (plus taxes, insur-
ance, and profit), when a rational landlord will decide to milk his
building. If you do not like graphs, and are satisfied with the state-
ment in the text above, I suggest you skip to the next section. If
you would prefer a more elegant and more definitive mathematical
statement of the conclusion, I can only apologize for my inability
to provide one.
As always, we need heroic assumptions in order to reduce the
problem to graphic form. As always, the claim is that though artifi-
cial, they do not obviate the interest of the result. The first as-
sumption is that the landlord operates either at a renewable level,
or at zero maintenance. Second, whenever he stops maintaining,
the rent he can charge falls instantly from the renewable to the
"deteriorating" level, and remains there for four years, at which
point the building leaves the stock. Making both rent and building
life continuous functions of variable maintenance expenditure
would greatly complicate the analysis without changing the
outcome.
In Figure 1, line AB represents the declining rent offers through
time for the premises maintained at the renewable level (this is not
a demand curve: it shows the dollar rent for a given unit in suc-
ceeding years, rather than dollar rent for more and more units).
Line CB shows the rent for the premises if the landlord is spending
no money at all on maintenance. AB and CB slope downward
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Figure 1:
Comparison of Revenues from Milking
and Maintaining
through time because tenants are getting poorer and poorer and
can offer less and less for the premises, whether maintained or de-
teriorating. They converge because as tenants become poorer the
rent premium for amenity declines.
Line OD is the amount of maintenance needed to keep the unit
in the stock (the renewable level), and it remains the same through
time, as shown in line DE. Distance OD is greater than distance
CA because during the period that interests us tenants are unwill-
ing to pay a rent premium for amenity equal to the cost of mainte-
nance at the renewable level. At point F (year eleven) the rent of-
fer for the premises maintained falls below the cost of
maintenance, as line AB intersects line DE. My goal is to show
that a rational landlord will begin to milk at a point to the left of
(earlier than) F, that is, at a time when tenants are still offering
enough rent to keep the building in the stock.
Suppose that at time 0, the landlord considers the possibility of
beginning to milk, and compares it with a policy of continuing to
maintain until, at point F, it becomes an obviously losing course.
Maintaining will yield, first, an income represented by the area
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ADF (total revenue of OAF[11, less maintenance cost of
ODF[11). At year eleven, the landlord will stop maintaining, and
earn a milker's terminal income of [11]GH[15] during the four
years the building remains in the stock in deteriorating condition.
Now suppose he begins to milk at time 0. Rent falls immedi-
ately to OC, and continues to decline for the four years the unit
remains in the stock. Total income is OCJ[4], with no deduction
for maintenance, because none is done. This course is less remu-
nerative than the alternative, because the net revenue lost through
milking, area ACJKF plus area [11]GH[15], is patently greater
than the net revenue gained, area ODK[4].
But now suppose that the landlord waits until year six, and then
reconsiders a milking course. Rent will fall from [6]L to [6]M. He
will lose the premium for amenity for the five years remaining to
year eleven and point F, represented by area LMPF. He will also
lose the terminal milking profits represented by area [11]GH[15].
He will gain four years of suspended maintenance payments, repre-
sented by area [6]NP[10].
Milking is more profitable than maintaining as of year six, be-
cause area [6]NP[10] is greater than area LMPF plus area
[11]GH[15]. The visual test of this is as follows:
[6]NP[10] = [11]FQ[15] (both equal four years of maintenance
costs).
[6]NP[10] minus [11]GH[15] therefore = Area FGHQ.
Area LMPF is, by visual inspection, less than area FGHQ.
Therefore, the saving from milking, area [6]NP[10] is greater
than the lost revenue, area LMPF plus [11]GH[15], from main-
taining to point F.
The discussion so far simply illustrates the proposition that pre-
mature milking may be a profit-maximizing strategy. To show that
there must be a point earlier than point F (eleven years) at which
milking is preferable to maintenance, we have to look at what
would happen if the curves were drawn so as to minimize the gains
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Figure 2:
Proof that Milking Must Eventually
Become More Profitable than Maintaining
In Figure 2, suppose that the landlord begins to milk in year ten
and collects rent for the deteriorating premises for four years until
year fourteen. Her milking revenue will be area [10]PS[14]. If she
had behaved "optimally" by continuing to maintain to year eleven,
her revenue would have consisted of two elements: the net pre-
mium for amenity during the one year she would have continued to
maintain, area PRF, plus terminal milking revenue of [11]GH[15].
Area [11]GS[14] will be revenue to the landlord whether she
milks in year ten or in year eleven. The difference between the two
courses of action is the difference between area [10]PG[11], reve-
nue from premature milking, and the sum of the areas PRF and
[14]SH[15], lost net revenue from maintaining plus lost terminal
milking revenue.
As we delay the decision to milk further and further, all of these
areas approach zero, which they attain at year eleven, when the
two options become identical. It is nonetheless the case that no
matter how the curves are shaped there will come a time before
year eleven when the premature milking area will be greater than
1987]
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the sum of the two areas that represent the gains from
maintaining.
The area [10]PG[11] will be larger than area [14]SH[15] right up
to the point at which they both disappear in year eleven, because
by hypothesis the rent offer for deteriorating premises declines
through time. The difference between these areas represents the
fact that the premature milker will receive a larger offer for the
deteriorating premises than the maintainer, because the main-
tainer starts terminal milking later in the game, when the tenants'
ability to pay is smaller.
The maintainer's net gain from providing amenity, area PRF,
may initially be large enough to overcome this difference and make
maintenance the better strategy. Eventually, however, as PRF de-
clines toward zero, it must become smaller than the difference be-
tween [10]PG[11] and [14]SH[15], which remains positive even at
the limit of year eleven. When this point is reached, the landlord
begins premature milking.
V. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF MILKING
There are three important points about this conclusion. First, it
means that if we permit milking, the actual life of the building
(under the assumptions) will always be shorter than the fifteen-
year life span it would have if we selectively enforced the warranty
of habitability. Assume that we can enforce the warranty just
enough to compel the landlord to maintain the building at the re-
newable level. In our hypothetical, it would be eleven years until
the rent did not cover this cost (plus taxes, insurance, and norma!
profit). At that point, if we continue to enforce the warranty, the
landlord will walk away. But if we then relax enforcement, she will
milk for four years, to the end of the building's fifteen-year life
span. In other words, if real world circumstances corresponded to
the model, selectively enforcing the warranty could extend the
lives of buildings in declining neighborhoods.
Second, and equally important, the length of the extension is in-
determinate unless we have a great deal of specific data about the
building and the market. It might be the case that milking made
sense from the very beginning of neighborhood decline. And it
might also be the case that it only made sense in the very last part
of the cycle. The life extension brought about by enforcing the
warranty might be very substantial, or trivial, or anything in
between.
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Third, extending the life of buildings in the stock adds to the
supply of housing. Thus if the warranty extends building life, it
should also depress rents, an outcome not contemplated by the
dominant view. Of course, the amount of the supply-increasing,
rent-decreasing effect is indeterminate, and we have to assess it in
the context of the general impact of the warranty on the price and
quantity of low income housing.
VI. IMPACT OF THE WARRANTY ON HOUSING PRICE AND QUANTITY
Begin with the conventional assumption that the price and
quantity of low income housing is determined by the interaction of
supply and demand. As a preliminary matter, we might try to ap-
ply to this market the standard analysis of the impact of a compul-
sory term in a consumer contract.13 This analysis suggests, first,
that if we have to impose the term it is worth less to consumers
than it costs sellers to provide it. Second, sellers will add the cost
of the term to the cost of the commodity and try to pass it on
through higher prices. Buyers will respond by demanding less. The
outcome should be less quantity at a higher price, with buyers and
sellers bearing the unwanted extra cost in proportions determined
by the shapes of the supply and demand curves.
In the housing case, this analysis suggests that landlords will
pass along some of the increased maintenance costs generated by
the warranty, so that rents will go up. Tenants will be forced to
purchase more amenity than they want; they will pay more for less
housing, albeit housing of better quality. The outcome falls into
the general category of liberal reforms that hurt their supposed
beneficiaries. In the absence of regulation, the poor supposedly get
the level of housing amenity they want, given their incomes and
the cost of housing. Attempts to improve their situation by pater-
nalistic interference with their freedom of choice supposedly just
make matters worse. 14
In the general case, there are a number of ways to critique this
critique of regulation. To begin with, transaction costs, and partic-
ularly problems of information, may be preventing consumers from
13. See generally Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tort
Law, With Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41
MD. L. REv. 563, 590-624 (1982).
14. See generally Hirsch, Hirsch & Margolis, Regression Analysis of the Effects of Hab-
itability Laws Upon Rent: An Empirical Observation on the Ackerman - Komesar Debate,
63 CAL. L. REv. 1098, 1116-24 (1975); R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 356-59 (2d ed.
1977).
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getting what is in fact their preferred outcome of warranted prem-
ises.15 Moreover, there may be external effects of consumer deci-
sions on the warranty that ought to be included in a social calculus
of its desirability, and that would lead to the conclusion that it is
socially optimal. 16
Third, there may be a strong paternalist case 17 in favor of the
warranty if it turns out that eliminating very bad units, forcing
marginally higher densities in better maintained conditions, has
long-term beneficial effects on poor families. Fourth, it is just
wrong to assert that "the poor" as a group are made worse off by
the imposition of a compulsory term. Depending on the shape of
the supply and demand curves, the poor as a group may be en-
riched at the expense of their suppliers as a group (loss to both is
also possible, as is enrichment of sellers at the expense of
buyers).' 8
My view is that those who have applied these arguments to the
low income housing case are persuasive in favor of the warranty of
habitability. The fact remains that this position concedes that en-
forcing the warranty will have the effect of reducing the quantity
of low income housing and raising its price. In the best case, there
are enough poor people who actually benefit from this change so
that its bad effect on other poor people (and landlords) seems an
acceptable cost."
Bruce Ackerman is the exception in this respect.20 He explores
the case in which there is a very small or null reduction in supply
because landlords have nowhere to go. The existence of marginal
tenants who put a very low value on housing amenity may prevent
landlords from passing through any of the cost of a comprehensive
housing code enforcement program. Presumably a nondisclaimable
warranty that was somehow equally comprehensively enforced
would have the same effect in his model.
Ackerman, however, sees piecemeal warranty enforcement by in-
dividual tenants using civil remedies as counterproductive. In his
model, it is the need to compete for the marginal, amenity-indiffer-
ent tenant that prevents landlords from passing on the costs of
15. Cf. Kennedy, supra note 13, at 597-604.
16. See Ackerman, supra note 3, at 1177-79; Markovits, supra note 4, at 1831-33.
17. See generally Kennedy, supra note 13, at 624-49.
18. See id. at 609-14, 655-58; Markovits, supra note 4, at 1823-27.
19. See Ackerman, supra note 3, at 1179-81; Markovits, supra note 4, at 1827-30.
20. Ackerman, supra note 3.
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code enforcement.2" If improvement occurs piecemeal, landlords
can raise the rent on improved premises and attract those among
the low income tenant population who are willing to pay more for
amenity. The result is higher rent, though presumably the increase
will be less than the landlord has had to spend (or the landlord
would have made the improvement without the pressure of the
warranty).
To my mind, Ackerman's analysis of code enforcement is a very
important special case of the general analysis of a compulsory
term, the special case in which landlords locked into their units
confront marginal tenants indifferent to amenity and thus have to
eat the cost of across-the-board improvement. His contribution to
the discussion of the impact of the warranty of habitability is to
show that the redistributive goals of intervention in this special
situation will be jeopardized if it is carried out piecemeal through
private law remedies. He is like everyone else, however, in assum-
ing that the impact of code or warranty enforcement will be at best
neutral with respect to the supply of units, and more likely than
not will reduce it, causing a rent increase.22
VII. MIGHT THE WARRANTY DEPRESS RENTS?
The critics of the warranty assume that there are substantial
numbers of sub-warranty units that landlords will either upgrade
(passing along at least part of the cost as increased rent) or aban-
don (where the cost of upgrading makes operating the building a
losing proposition, given what tenants will pay for improve-
ments).2 s The adverse impact of the warranty comes from the re-
moval of substandard units from the stock through abandonment,
and from rent increases reflecting upgrading. Together, they crowd
the low income population into offering more money for less hous-
ing (of higher quality).
21. Id. at 1193-96.
22. See id. at 1111-12; cf. id. at 1104 n.15. I venture the guess that Ackerman would have
considered the impact of code enforcement on building life had he written only a few years
after he did. The wave of abandonment discussed supra note 10 and infra note 41 was
barely recognized or understood in 1971.
23. Meyers, The Covenant of Habitability and the American Law Institute, 27 STAN. L.
REV. 879, 889-93 (1975). Meyers also suggests that in cases where the landlord has to up-
grade without raising rent the warranty will reduce the funds available for maintenance and
therefore shorten building life. This argument leaves out altogether the effect of warranty-
induced maintenance expenditures on building life, and seems to operate on the physicalis-
tic understanding of abandonment critiqued supra note 12.
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At this point, we have to ask whether the life-extending effect of
a warranty that prevented milking might not counterbalance the
supply-reducing, rent-increasing effects of upgrading and abandon-
ment. Indeed, it seems at least possible that if we enforced the
warranty very selectively, it might increase supply and push down
prices, rather than the reverse.
Assume that we are trying to improve the housing conditions of
the poor without increasing rent at all. Under the conditions of the
model we have been working with, it would make sense to try to
identify those buildings that are about to be milked, and enforce
the warranty to the extent necessary to prevent that outcome. We
would ignore (a) those buildings in such bad condition that their
owners would abandon rather than comply with the warranty, and
(b) those buildings that would stay in the stock after upgrading to
the renewable level, but at higher rents.
In other words, we would not enforce the warranty against the
worst housing in the stock. We would allow it to deteriorate toward
abandonment, or deal with it in some other way (such as by expro-
priating it for the benefit of its occupants). Instead, we would use
the warranty to prevent landlords in declining neighborhoods from
beginning to milk before falling rent offers made it necessary for
them to do so to avoid a loss. And when we did enforce it, we
would do so only to the extent necessary to prevent that kind of
milking.
Assuming again the conditions of this model, there would be no
reduction in supply due to abandonment and no rent increases due
to upgrading. The warranty would extend the lives of low income
buildings because it would force landlords to go on maintaining at
the renewable level when they would otherwise have chosen to
milk toward abandonment. Buildings in declining neighborhoods
would still be milked and abandoned eventually, when rent offers
fell below the renewable maintenance level. But no building would
be milked or abandoned when there were still tenants willing to
pay a sum in rent large enough to cover the landlord's cost.
Under conventional assumptions, the increase in the supply of
low income housing caused by life extension should depress rents.
Since our ultraselective enforcement policy prevents warranty ac-
tions from ever increasing rents or inducing abandonment, the
rent-depressing effect of life extension would be the only effect in
the field. The overall impact of the warranty would be to make
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tenants as a group better off at the expense of landlords by in-
creasing housing quantity while reducing its price.2"
Of course, this case is particularly implausible because it would
require the enforcers to make extremely fine discriminations be-
tween units. They would have to distinguish failures in mainte-
nance that signaled the beginning of milking (and could be reme-
died without forcing rent increases) from failures whose correction
would produce either rent increases or abandonment. We need to
consider the case in which this kind of fine tuning is impossible.
Note that the policymaker has a wide range of choice. At one
extreme, she could invest resources in accurately identifying build-
ings on the verge of milking, while carefully avoiding all others. At
the other, she could enforce a warranty designed to upgrade living
conditions beyond the renewable level, and enforce it across the
board. Selective enforcement means picking a standard and a set
of targets with a view to administrative cost, impact on the stock
through abandonment and upgrading, impact on the stock through
life extension, and impact on living conditions.
As soon as the warranty begins to force some units out of the
stock (because it would cost more to upgrade them than can be
recovered through rent increases) and to push some into upgrading
with rent increases, the overall impact of enforcement becomes in-
determinate. Where price and quantity end up depends on how
large the supply-increasing, rent-depressing effect of stopping
milking is, in comparison with the supply-reducing, rent-enhancing
effects of upgrading and abandonment.
24. The statement in the text is too simple. The initial impact of an anti-milking war-
ranty should be to keep buildings in the maintained category that would otherwise have
begun to deteriorate toward abandonment. This should change the relative prices of main-
tained and deteriorating premises. The price change will have a redistributive effect within
the low income group, though its character is hard to predict. As maintained premises get
cheaper, deteriorating premises may get more expensive. But the movement of tenants into
cheaper maintained units should also weaken demand for milked units, perhaps so far that
their absolute price falls (though not their price relative to maintained units). Moreover,
buildings held in the maintained category by the warranty will eventually reach the point
where they do not command enough rent to keep them in the black, and we must then
either let their landlords milk them or deal with them in some other way. In other words,
the warranty initially chokes off the supply of milked housing, but eventually it resumes.
The long-term consequences for the overall cost of low income housing are clearly favorable,
but the implications for the composition and relative prices of the low income stock are
indeterminate.
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VIII. CRITIQUES OF THE SUPPLY EFFECT
It seems to be a common intuition among people with law and
economics training that this result just has to be wrong: it should
not be possible to help the poor by enforcing the warranty. I will
respond here to two different lines of attack.
First, the withdrawal of the milking option reduces the profit-
ability of low income housing by increasing its cost to landlords,
and should therefore reduce supply, not just through abandonment
but also by reducing new construction and slowing the filtering
process. Second, even if life extension through an antimilking war-
ranty drove prices down, any benefit to the poor would be wiped
out either by the choking off of filtering (this time by lower prices
rather than by higher costs), or by an influx of middle income te-
nants bidding for upgraded units.
With respect to the first, there are really two arguments. There
is the question of the impact on upper income construction of loss
of the milking option if and when the building filters down. In
other words, a perfectly foresighted builder would calculate into
the expected income stream of a new unit some discounted sum
reflecting the advantage of milking over maintaining in the final
stages of decline. Ackerman argues convincingly that uncertainty
as to which neighborhoods will decline and when makes it unlikely
that upper income builders' reactions to code enforcement in the
slums will have an impact on new construction.25
But enforcing the warranty (or code) might affect landlord deci-
sions, and therefore supply, at the point when neighborhood de-
cline begins. Landlords who know they will be forced to keep
maintaining, at least until rents have fallen below maintenance
costs (plus taxes, insurance, and normal profit), will take a less
sanguine view of the future of their investment than they would if
they knew they could start to milk whenever it appeared to be the
profit-maximizing strategy.
Under the simplest kind of filtering model, this reduction of
landlord expectations of gain will not affect the filtering process.
The simplest models assume either a chain of single houses of de-
25. Id. at 1117. Compare Komesar, Return to Slumville: A Critique of the Ackerman
Analysis of Housing Code Enforcement and the Poor, 82 YALE L.J. 1175, 1188-91 (1973)
(arguing that the costs of a code enforcement program would have a significant effect on
new housing construction) with Ackerman, More On Slum Housing and Redistribution Pol-
icy: A Reply to Professor Komesar, 82 YALE L.J. 1194, 1204-06 (1973) (arguing that uncer-
tainties as to the future effects of code enforcement make it unlikely that builders would
consider those future costs in new construction planning).
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clining quality, or that each neighborhood is homogeneous and fil-
ters down as a unit. If this is the case, the effect of new construc-
tion at the top of the chain is that each successive owner further
down simply loses his earlier tenants who move up.
In this situation owners have no choice but to rent to the people
moving in from below, at whatever price will clear the market. The
full impact of the prohibition on premature milking falls on low
income landlords. Because they are "locked in," meaning that they
no longer have higher income tenants, they have to let their units
filter. Once they have done this, it is in their interest to go on oper-
ating until rent no longer covers whatever maintenance is com-
pelled through the warranty. Even though they could make more
money if they were allowed to milk, they will not, as the previous
analysis showed, prematurely withdraw their units by
abandonment.
Now suppose that new construction for the rich allows more
middle income people to move out of their old neighborhood. But
instead of imagining that these units go automatically to the poor,
imagine that some longtime middle income residents will increase
their consumption of space, say turning three-family into two-fam-
ily houses, if prices are low enough. In this model, the ultimate
disposition of the vacancies created by new construction depends
on the point of equilibrium between the price middle income peo-
ple will pay for more space and the price poor people will pay to
filter up into a new neighborhood.
Even in this more complicated model, the warranty does not
slow filtering. Landlords have no reason to discriminate as between
middle income and low income tenants. The whole neighborhood
will eventually decline as new construction elsewhere further soft-
ens demand. The loss of the option of premature milking means
that landlords will have fewer options, regardless of who they rent
to.20
But now suppose that filtering is occurring in the context of resi-
dential segregation by income class, brought about by the willing-
ness of middle income renters to pay a premium to live in an en-
tirely middle income neighborhood. Further suppose a border area
or transition zone that is less attractive to the middle class than
their core neighborhood, and more attractive to the poor than
26. But see Ackerman, supra note 3, at 1115-16 (Ackerman argues that code enforce-
ment can reduce trickle-down if landlords in more affluent areas are reluctant to rent to
lower income dwellers, in the belief that greater abuse of buildings will result and increase
the cost of code enforcement).
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theirs. Border landlords can decide which class of tenants to rent
to, and their decisions determine the equilibrium position of the
dividing line between zones.27
Suppose landlords assume that the choice to move a border unit
from middle to low income occupancy will likely be irreversible,
and that the course of events over the period of decline will be
different in the two areas. In the shrinking middle income area
prices will decline, but more slowly than in the low income area, as
the middle class departs and the better off among the poor move in
behind them. Abandonment occurs only in the core of the low in-
come area.
Under these assumptions, the milking option is likely to be more
attractive to low income than middle income landlords. A border
landlord who loses the milking option because of the warranty will
find low income tenants marginally less attractive, compared to
middle income tenants, than he did before. It follows that enforc-
ing the warranty might slow the rate of filtering. Softening demand
has to drive prices down further in the middle income area before
it makes sense for a border landlord to switch a unit from middle
to low income occupancy. (On the other hand, it is easy to imagine
that neighborhood effects, in this case group expectations about
what is going to happen to the border zone as a whole, will be so
strong that a unit will filter or not on that basis, without much
sensitivity to changes in the profitability of individual buildings.)
What this means is that in estimating the overall impact of en-
forcing the warranty, we have to take account of the possible slow-
ing of the filtering process, along with abandonment and rent in-
creases through upgrading. This is an effect we cannot evade even
by highly selective enforcement.
When we turn to the impact of a fall in rents, the situation is
less complex. First, it is correct that if the warranty increases sup-
ply and decreases rents, there will be a slowing of the filtering pro-
cess. But this is not a coherent objection to the claim that the war-
ranty will help the poor at the expense of their landlords. The
reduction in filtering occurs because the poor are unwilling to bid
as much for housing filtering down as they were before life exten-
sion increased the low income stock. As a result, middle income
renters will acquire a greater share of the space made available by
27. See Montgomery & Mandelker, supra note 5, at 192-99 (excerpt from C. LEVEN, J.
LITTLE, H. NOURSE & R. READ, NEIGHBORHOOD CHANGE: LESSONS IN THE DYNAMICS OF URBAN
DECAY 37-47 (1976)).
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new construction for the rich. The warranty therefore benefits
them as well as those below them in the chain.
Second, the filtering model presupposes that the poorest house-
holds rent at the bottom of the chain. If enforcing the warranty
were to increase supply by extending the lives of buildings that
were about to be prematurely milked, and drive down the prices
for units at the end of the chain, it is possible that there would be
an influx of middle income people who would bid these now cheap
units up and away from the poor.
The model we have been discussing is one of neighborhood de-
cline. Within the standard filtering analysis, incomes do not in-
crease and their distribution does not change. New construction by
the rich is the motor that drives the system. The reason for prema-
ture milking is failure of demand for maintained low income
housing.
In this model, there will indeed be some influx of middle income
tenants to the low income neighborhood in response to a fall in
rent there. But this effect, like the slowing of filtering, occurs be-
cause the poor are no longer willing to pay enough for now more
plentiful housing to keep all of it in their hands. If the warranty
depresses rents, some middle income families will bid against ex-
isting residents, and the border between neighborhoods may move.
Middle income people will thus benefit. They will filter backwards
to the extent that the slackening of low income demand makes it
cheaper for them to convert in the slums than to move up the
chain in response to new construction by the rich.
This is not to deny even for a moment the reality of the phe-
nomenon of gentrification, in which increased and redirected mid-
dle class demand displaces and impoverishes low income tenants.
When this happens, it is typically driven by market forces that
dwarf the conceivable impact of a warranty that merely requires
maintenance at the renewable level. It would be silly to blame it on
the warranty, or as I will argue later on,28 to expect the warranty to
do more than a little to stop it. We need other ways to deal with it
(rent control, eviction for cause laws, condo conversion restrictions,
removal permits, and so forth).
But it is wrong to conclude from the fact that gentrification oc-
curs that it is occurring or will occur everywhere. In many neigh-
borhoods and indeed whole regions of the country there is little or
no danger from this direction. The argument for the warranty is
28. See infra pp. 517-18.
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addressed to those situations where the reality is neighborhood de-
cline and the goal is to stop displacement through abandonment
rather than through middle class buy out.
I conclude that it is perfectly possible that an enforcement cam-
paign that attacked all substandard conditions could slow down
premature milking so much that, even with substantial upgrading
and abandonment, rents would end up lower and quantities greater
than they were to begin with. But the campaign could end up with
just the opposite result, or it could improve quality while leaving
price and quantity unchanged. Which it will be is a question that
can be settled only by an appeal to the facts of particular cases.
Microeconomic theory at this level of abstraction cannot tell us
what to expect.
It is an important corollary that a policymaker working with this
model does not have to choose between comprehensive enforce-
ment and no enforcement at all. In this respect, the model is strik-
ingly different from Ackerman's. If we can identify with confidence
a single unit that is about to be prematurely milked, it makes
sense to enforce the warranty against it to extend its life in the
stock. This will increase supply, however marginally, and put
downward pressure on rents.
IX. FACTORS CONDUCIVE TO MILKING
It should also be possible to identify institutional factors that
are conducive to milking, in the sense of making it more likely that
a landlord will see it as in his interest to suspend (or dramatically
reduce) maintenance and take his chances on losing the building.
This section makes a preliminary catalogue of such factors.
(1) Unlike the owner for the long term, the milking owner does
not expect to be able to sell the building but rather to abandon it.
Subject to the considerations in section (4) below, he has few in-
centives to pay property taxes if the city will not foreclose its liens
and take the building before he has finished with it. If the city has
a policy of slow or otherwise lax enforcement, the owner will find
milking more attractive than it otherwise would be. Conversely, if
the city makes it impossible or very difficult for owners of property
in declining neighborhoods to obtain tax abatements reflecting
lower values, the cost of the maintenance strategy will be greater
than it "ought" to be on the assumption of 100% valuation.
When a milker can simultaneously stop maintaining and stop
paying taxes, while a maintainer must pay the city on the basis of
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an unrealistically high valuation, 29 the city is inadvertently push-
ing housing into the milking category. Many cities in decline have
been reluctant either to adjust valuations or to take buildings for
nonpayment 30 (because they fear that doing so would accelerate
abandonment, because of antiquated underfunded administration,
because of corruption, or for all three reasons).
(2) Banks may respond to decline, or to racial transition, by
"redlining," that is, by reducing or eliminating mortgage money for
the neighborhood .3 Redlining makes it hard for landlords to fi-
nance major maintenance, and drives resale values down. New
buyers must scramble for the available bank funds, or look for sell-
ers who will take back purchase money mortgages. A simultaneous
increase in the financial cost of maintenance and decrease in resale
value will tilt marginal owners into the milking strategy.
(3) To the extent a milker can recoup some of his investment at
the end of the process, this course of action becomes more attrac-
tive relative to a maintenance strategy. One possibility of this kind
is arson. If owners can insure buildings for sums of money that
reflect their maintained value, and then burn them and collect the
proceeds at the end of the milking process, milking will be dramat-
ically more profitable, compared to maintenance, than it would
otherwise be. Brady's32 studies establish both that arson for profit
has been a serious problem in declining neighborhoods, and that it
is often part of a milking strategy.
(4) If there is a possibility that a declining neighborhood will
eventually be converted from low to middle or high income hous-
ing, milking may make sense as a form of speculation. The owner
calculates that if conversion and the displacement of the low in-
come population eventually occur, there will be massive rehabilita-
tion, or the leveling of existing structures to make way for new
construction.
When this happens, the value of neighborhood land may actually
be greater without buildings than with them, even if they have
been maintained at reasonable levels in the interim. The chance
that increased land values may eventually allow recoupment of any
possible loss from building deterioration makes milking a more and
29. See G. PETERSON, A. SOLOMON, H. MADJID & W. APGAR, JR., PROPERTY TAXES, Hous-
ING AND THE CITIES 26 (1973).
30. Id. at 44.
31. See Note, Attacking the Urban Redlining Problem, 56 B.U.L. REV. 989 (1976).
32. Brady, The Social Economy of Arson, 6 RES. IN LAW, DEVIANCE & Soc. CONTROL 179
(1984).
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maintenance a less rational strategy. (It may or may not provide
an incentive to pay taxes, depending on whether slow foreclosure
and resale, along with protracted protection of the owner's equity
of redemption make it rational to gamble on nonpayment.) 33
(5) In deciding between maintenance and milking, an owner may
be influenced by the possibility of bailing out at the end by selling
at an above market price to a newcomer from a poorer neighbor-
hood who (a) is excluded from the purchase of housing elsewhere
by racial discrimination, and (b) underestimates both the likeli-
hood of further decline and the costs of ownership. 34
These buyers may be able to borrow funds through subsidized or
defrauded government programs, or they may be willing to give
purchase money mortgages that leave them with negative equity
from the start. They are also likely to be undercapitalized, because
there is a discontinuity in the supply of capital to them. A higher
cost maintenance strategy will be less viable for them, and milking
consequently more attractive, than would be the case for main-
stream investors.
(6) The milker may be part of a quasi-criminal subculture that
can evict illegally (to enforce payment of rent or resist tenant de-
mands for maintenance), obtain capital outside legitimate chan-
nels, and burn buildings for profit, all at lower psychic costs with
lower risks of detection or punishment than would be the case for
mainstream bureaucratically organized investors. 5 (There is no
reason to believe that milkers will make super profits, or that they
will be individually wealthy. Indeed, the evidence suggests that
there are all kinds.)36
(7) Once a landlord adopts a milking strategy, it may quickly
become irrational to reverse it even in the face of improving condi-
tions. Deferred maintenance will cost more when finally under-
taken than it would have if done on a "normal" schedule. When
the boiler breaks down and is not repaired, pipes eventually freeze,
leaking water causes structural damage, and the costs of "rehab"
are far greater than what the landlord initially saved on the boiler.
The result is a "ratchet" effect in which the costs of reversing de-
cline through an upgrading strategy get higher and higher as time
passes.
33. Id.
34. See, e.g., Gottlieb, FHA Case Recalls Bushwick in 70's, N.Y. Times, Feb. 2, 1986, at
35, col. 4.
35. Brady, supra note 32.
36. G. STERNLIEB, THE TENEMENT LANDLORD 76-97 (1969).
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These factors conducive to milking make it plausible that in
many real world situations landlords will abandon buildings well
before the time when they no longer command enough rent to
cover maintenance at the renewable level. The same conclusion
flows from a conventional transaction cost analysis of the impact of
a mortgage on milking.
X. THE IMPACT OF A MORTGAGE ON MILKING
Suppose that low income rental housing is quite heavily mort-
gaged at the time neighborhood decline begins, as is often the case.
Decline will quickly put the highly leveraged owner into a situation
of negative equity, meaning that if he sold the building the pro-
ceeds would not cover the mortgage. The bank would generally
then have the right to seek a deficiency judgment against his other
assets. As the neighborhood declines, his rent roll will fall, and,
because of his monthly mortgage payments, he will confront a neg-
ative net cash flow (as well as negative equity) long before an out-
right owner would. (Net cash flow equals rent roll minus mainte-
nance, administrative expenses, taxes, insurance, and mortgage
payments.)
Assuming for the moment that his bank will not negotiate with
him, his choices are: (a) continue as before, losing money every
month, (b) sell or default, and face a deficiency judgment, or (c)
keep up the mortgage payments but reduce maintenance or tax
payments or both. (Note that holding on to the building will not
necessarily greatly increase the owner's equity, since many mort-
gages on slum property have "balloons," meaning that most of the
loan comes due at term.)
Imagine two buildings in a declining neighborhood, identical ex-
cept that one is mortgaged and the other is not, at the moment
when the encumbered building goes into negative net cash flow. As
of this moment, the mortgaged owner is more likely than the unen-
cumbered one to figure it is in his interest to begin milking, rather
than selling or maintaining, simply because he has no equity at
stake if he milks, can maintain only at a loss, and faces a deficiency
judgment if he bails out.
As long as rent covers the mortgage (supposing the city will not
foreclose at all quickly), the building is like an unmarketable
bond-it just keeps on producing income at no cost. It is true that
if he does not maintain it will eventually be worthless, but it is
already worthless to an owner with negative equity. When it be-
comes uninhabitable, the owner will abandon it, and take his
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chances with what may then be a much smaller (also possibly
larger) deficiency judgment if the mortgage is not yet paid and the
bank goes after him.
This course of action might be the one the bank itself would
choose for the owner if the only alternative were sale for what the
market will bear. The bank will prefer milking to sale when the
proceeds of sale and deficiency judgment would be less than the
discounted value of the stream of mortgage payments the bank can
anticipate during the milking process (adjusted for the increased
riskiness of the loan as the neighborhood declines and the deterio-
rating tax-delinquent building loses its value as security).
The bank might also be biased against foreclosure by internal
bureaucratic factors (loan officers do not like to admit mistakes),
or by contingent factors like a decline in mortgage interest rates.
But it is overwhelmingly likely that the bank would prefer contin-
ued maintenance, at a loss to the owner, over milking.
If there were no transaction costs, the bank would find out about
the decline in value and about the owner's decision to milk, and
then confront him with foreclosure on the ground that he was im-
pairing their security. The owner would then have to choose be-
tween foreclosure and maintaining at a loss so as to keep the mort-
gage. Or he might make a deal, perhaps agreeing to put some
money into the building to preserve it as security, and to pay
taxes, in exchange for being allowed to continue to milk.
A better deal might involve some forgiveness or reduction of
mortgage payments in exchange for some increase in maintenance.
But given that the bank has an effective threat and a conflict of
interest with the owner, any deal will be worse for him than his
original choice of milking pure and simple.
In real life, the owner may be able to avoid having to make any
such concessions to the bank just because it is too expensive for
the bank to extract them. The owner can conceal or just not report
the facts that would indicate milking. The costs to the bank of get-
ting information about mortgagors, proving impairment of secur-
ity, processing foreclosure and resale, and especially of actually col-
lecting a deficiency judgment, may all be great enough to impose a
strong bias in favor of letting the owner do what he wants. On the
other side of the ledger, it is hard to see how transaction costs will
ever promote a long-term maintenance strategy.
If we look at the overall impact of mortgages, we can conclude
that they will put owners into negative equity and negative net
cash flow much earlier than would happen if they held unencum-
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bered. At the point at which the mortgagor has to choose between
sale with a deficiency judgment, continuing prior maintenance
levels at a loss, and milking, the unencumbered owner still has pos-
itive equity and positive cash flow, though both are declining.
Mortgaged owners are therefore likely to adopt milking strategies
before unmortgaged ones. This initial tilt may be counteracted by
the intervention of bank mortgagees trying to preserve the value of
their security. But because intervention is costly, it is unlikely to
fully compensate for the initial effect.
XI. ABANDONMENT OF A MORTGAGED BUILDING DOES NOT
INDICATE THAT IT WAS UNPROFITABLE
When a mortgaged landlord milks his building and then aban-
dons it, he may explain his action by saying that "the building was
unprofitable" and that the tenants "were unable to pay enough
rent to make it possible to maintain the building." From the land-
lord's point of view, this statement is quite true. But it is com-
pletely false, counterfactual, from the point of view of the
economy.
The tenants were unable to pay enough rent to cover mainte-
nance and the landlord's mortgage and taxes. If the landlord had
resold the building, he would have suffered a loss (and possibly a
deficiency judgment), but the new owner would have been able to
make a profit by maintaining the building as a long-term invest-
ment. Because of the lower sale price, a new owner's mortgage and
taxes would have been lower (unless the city refuses to abate).
If the rent roll declined again, another sale at a yet lower price
could again reduce mortgage and taxes. Until the rent roll falls to a
level below the cost of standard maintenance, so that the building
has zero market value as a long-term investment, it is wrong to say
that it is "unprofitable," given that someone, even if not the cur-
rent owner, could make money off it.
Milking induced by the particular interests of mortgagors with
negative equity and cash flow is not in itself an indication that the
poor cannot pay the true cost of decently maintained housing.
Abandonment by the mortgagor reflects inability to pay the cost of
amenity only when milking starts after the building is in such bad
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shape, and the tenants' incomes are so low, that the tenants could
not afford to keep it up even if they owned it outright.3 7
If we could use the warranty or code enforcement to prevent
milking induced by transaction costs in the mortgagor/mortgagee
relationship, we would induce the results favored by conventional
efficiency analysis. The distributive effect of intervention should be
to impoverish mortgagors and improve the situations of mortgagee
banks and low income tenants.
XII. NEIGHBORHOOD EFFECTS AND UNSTABLE EQUILIBRIUM
In this section, I will argue that premature milking plays a more
important role in the dynamics of neighborhood decline than ap-
pears from the analysis of individual buildings. Because the deci-
sion of one landlord influences that of his neighbors, there may be
external effects, downward vicious cycles, and prisoner's dilemmas
that lead to far more milking than suits anyone's interests.3"
Where this is the case, warranty or code enforcement may work to
bring about results that look good in efficiency terms, and, as in
the mortgagor/mortgagee situation, redistribute favorably to low
income tenants.
People's decisions about how to treat the housing they own are
affected by the decisions of their neighbors. For example, the value
of rental property is a function not only of structure and upkeep,
but of the structure and upkeep and occupancy of nearby build-
ings. Indeed, it is often the case that the market perception of the
desirability of a neighborhood has a strong enough effect on the
value of any given house to dwarf the impact on value of individual
owner decisions about maintenance.
Because of these interconnections or externalities, it is possible
for all the landlords in a neighborhood to find themselves "forced"
to make investment decisions that all agree are worse for them
than those that would occur if it were possible for them to act in
concert. For example, every landlord might be able to invest more
in maintenance of existing structures, hoping thereby to get higher
rents and increase property values, were it not for the fact that
37. An egregious example of the error discussed in the text occurs in Meyers, supra note
23, at 890-91. Meyers' article is probably the most misleading in a generally misleading body
of literature. See Ackerman, supra note 3, at 1103 n.14.
38. On neighborhood effects and prisoner's dilemma, see the editors' note in Montgom-
ery & Mandelker, supra note 5, at 188-92.
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each believes that others are and will continue disinvesting, so that
the neighborhood is in an inevitable state of decline."
The most important implication of neighborhood effects is the
possibility of an "unstable equilibrium" or "downward vicious cy-
cle" in those neighborhoods that are at the end of the filtering
chain."0 Remember that in its own terms the filtering model re-
quires a process of declining housing values leading ultimately to
abandonment or conversion. If neighborhood effects come into
play, this process may not be "orderly": it may not lead to gradual
declines with abandonment only of those units that have become
unrentable because there is better housing now available to their
former tenants.
Rather, the softening of values in a lower income neighborhood,
along with the gradual influx of poorer tenants who are "filtering
up" as old residents themselves move up and out, may cause a
chain reaction. In particular, the milking of a building may destroy
the viability of its neighbor so that it too has its highest valued use
as a wasting asset. This is "blight." "A bad apple spoils the bar-
rel." One shooting gallery spoils the neighborhood.
A milking outcome for the whole neighborhood may be the result
of a prisoner's dilemma in which no owner can afford to invest in
maintenance because so long as all other owners are milking, the
investment is overwhelmingly likely to be lost. If it were possible
to make and enforce an agreement to maintain without cost, such
an agreement might be the most profitable strategy for all.
Once the downward chain reaction gets going, it may lead to far
more abandonment in the neighborhoods where it began than the
filtering model requires. Conversely, other neighborhoods that
might, in an "orderly" process, undergo moderate decline may es-
cape unscathed. Because of neighborhood effects and unstable
equilibria, the market process of adjustment to new upper income
housing construction in the suburbs may be a random but dra-
matic pattern of low income neighborhood destruction, combined
with an equally random pattern of low income neighborhood sta-
bility or even upgrading."1
39. Davis & Whinston, The Economics of Urban Renewal, 26 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
105 (1961).
40. On unstable equilibrium and vicious cycles, see generally G. MYRDAL, ASIAN DRAMA
1843-78 (1970). For these ideas applied to neighborhoods and housing, see R. GOETZE, UN-
DERSTANDING NEIGHBORHOOD CHANGE (1979).
41. Four very different approaches to the issue of inner city abandonment support the
generalizations in the text. See Montgomery & Mandelker, supra note 5, at 192-199 (excerpt
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XIII. RACISM IN THE FILTERING PROCESS
Racism pervades the low income housing market, affecting the
housing conditions of the poor in many different ways. Here we are
concerned with classic housing discrimination.42 Housing discrimi-
nation constricts the black population of a city to a limited num-
ber of neighborhoods, whether by the use of force against black
pioneers in white neighborhoods or through nonviolent refusals to
sell or rent. It slows the filtering of units to poor blacks by
preventing them from moving into white neighborhoods where val-
ues are softening due to the movement to the suburbs. The limit-
ing of the possible supply of housing for the black poor will drive
up the price even of unmaintained shelter in the ghetto, thereby
squeezing low incomes.43 The squeeze means that poor black fami-
lies will have less disposable income available to bid for amenity
through maintenance at the renewable level.
The smaller the income available to bid for amenity, beyond
what is necessary to buy the worst shelter, the more likely it be-
comes that the best course for the landlord is to milk the building.
(As we saw earlier, milking becomes more profitable relative to
maintaining as the premium for amenity gets smaller.) Milking
ghetto buildings to abandonment means a permanent reduction in
the low income housing supply, since incomes are too low to sus-
tain new construction and discrimination prevents moving into
neighboring areas (except in tipping cases). The result will be to
raise the price of unmaintained shelter still higher, further reduc-
ing the desirability of maintaining vis-a-vis milking, and so on.44
This might be called the self-feeding effect of racial discrimina-
tion on milking: Discrimination constricts the supply of bad hous-
ing by raising its price, which sops up the income available to bid
for amenity through maintenance, making milking more attractive,
and through milking further reducing the supply of housing while
raising its price.
from C. LEVEN, J. LITTLE, H. NOURSE & R. READ, NEIGHBORHOOD CHANGE: LESSONS IN THE
DYNAMICS OF URBAN DECAY 37-47 (1976)); THE PRESIDENT'S NAT'L URB. POL'y REP. 5-17
(1980); M. CASTELLS, THE URBAN QUESTION 402-11 (1977); 0. NEWMAN, COMMUNITY OF INTER-
EST 78-99 (1980).
42. See generally D. FUSFELD & T. BATES, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE URBAN
GHETTO (1984); A. Hirsch, Paper Presented at the Consultation/Hearing of the United
States Commission on Civil Rights (Nov. 12-13, 1985), reprinted in 1 ISSUES IN HOUSING
DISCRIMINATION 56 (1986).
43. See Rose-Ackerman, The Political Economy of a Racist Housing Market, 4 J. OF
URB. ECON. 150 (1977).
44. Cf. R. MUTH, CITIES AND HOUSING 127, 135 (1969).
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XIV. THE IMPACT OF MILKING ON FILTERING
"Filtering by catastrophe" defeats the whole idea of filtering as a
benign social policy. It can mean that the poor move up from
neighborhood to neighborhood without any improvement in the
quality of their housing. Rather than new construction in the sub-
urbs making room for better housing at the bottom of the chain,
filtering by catastrophe just moves the bottom around geographi-
cally, or even causes it to deteriorate. Given unstable equilibrium
in low income markets, there is nothing in the system to prevent
the poor from ending up paying rents that are sufficient to main-
tain housing in good condition, but which in fact buy them dra-
matically substandard accommodations. When a landlord decides
that the highest valued use of a viable building (one that could be
profitably maintained as a long-term investment) is in fact to milk
it, his decision directly increases the likelihood of such a disastrous
outcome.
We saw in the case of the heavily mortgaged owner that milking
may be the best choice at a time when maintaining the building
would still be profitable to an unencumbered owner. We saw also
that there are strong elements in low income neighborhoods, from
tax policy to arson to the hope of eventual gentrification or racial
transition, that may induce a landlord to milk a building that is
viable.
Each of these factors is intensified by neighborhood effects, the
possibility of downward vicious cycles, prisoner's dilemma, and the
"self-feeding" effect as racial discrimination reduces supply, drives
up the price of bad shelter and pinches the resources available to
pay for amenity. In this way, not only can milking happen to a
single viable building, it is also a social process, that can wipe out
a whole viable neighborhood.
When this occurs, milking sops up the units that were supposed
to reduce the cost (unmaintained) of the least desirable shelter to
zero while steadily improving its quality. It eliminates the poten-
tial benefits of the new construction at the top of the chain that
touched off the process in the first place. And it leads to lower
living standards for the poor, because rents for both maintained
and dilapidated units will be higher, and amenity consequently
lower, than would have been the case if the milked buildings had
remained in the stock. In short, by increasing, perhaps dramati-
cally, the scarcity of buildings at the end of the chain, it reduces
the purchasing power of the low income dollar.
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We might be able to counteract these effects by enforcing the
warranty or code to prevent milking of viable buildings. There
would be fewer neighborhood effects, less probability of a down-
ward chain reaction, no prisoner's dilemma at the bottom, and no
self-feeding through inflation of the price of bad shelter. The en-
forcement of the warranty might therefore do more than increase
the supply by saving individual buildings. It might stabilize chang-
ing neighborhoods by reducing the tendency toward cumulative
decline.
XV. WHAT To Do WITH NONVIABLE BUILDINGS
In the early stages of warranty enforcement, there would be
many buildings that would be viable had they been maintained,
but which have been (illegally) milked into an irreversibly deterio-
rated condition. Moreover, if enforcement took place in the context
of a (stabilized) filtering process, new buildings would constantly
reach the point where their landlords would just abandon if not
permitted to milk, as the movement of low income people out of
their old neighborhoods into new ones gradually reduced the rental
value of the worst slum units. If there are poor people who cannot
pay the costs of maintaining their housing as a long-term invest-
ment, and no assistance is available to them, it may be a good idea
to let them rent from landlords who are minimizing the losses asso-
ciated with such nonviable buildings by milking toward
abandonment.
Furthermore, even tenants who could pay for maintained prem-
ises may prefer to live in buildings landlords are milking at the end
of the chain, if they would rather spend their money on things
other than housing amenity. In each of these cases, milking be-
comes an issue of paternalism: To what extent do we want to im-
pose minimum living standards on adults and their children, when
we are unwilling to make available enough income so that tenants
will voluntarily pay for those standards.
I think a good case can be made for enforcing the warranty and
forcing the abandonment of nonviable milked housing, even
though doing so imposes minima by the cruel device of forcing dis-
placed tenants to double up. (The argument is frankly paternalist,
but also relies on external effects on children and neighbors of te-
nants in substandard housing.) But there may be an even better
case for cities taking over nonviable buildings through eminent do-
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main and distributing them to low income tenants as limited eq-
uity co-operatives." 5
To begin with, in valuing a nonviable building for just compen-
sation purposes, we should ask what market price it would bring if
sold subject to an easily enforceable legal duty to bring it up to the
warranty standard. If it is possible to rehab the building and make
money off it maintained, so that the market value of the building
with this legal liability attached is positive, then the building is
viable, and we are back to a situation in which enforcing the war-
ranty to the hilt will help the tenants (by forcing resale to a buyer
who can make a go of it). If the building is truly nonviable, this
price will be zero.
Having taken the nonviable low income housing stock for zero
compensation, the city could improve the situation of those te-
nants who have to or want to live at the absolute tail end of the
filtering chain by simply handing their apartments over to them
for free. This eliminates whatever rent the milking landlord was
able to derive from the absolute scarcity of housing at the bottom
(as opposed to rent based on location or maintenance services).
But there are numerous other possibilities, including city rehab
through bond issues with the city becoming the landlord, and, my
preference, the limited equity co-operative. This is not the place to
explore these choices. The key point is that the city should pay
nothing when it takes, and should dispose of the buildings to in-
crease the welfare of the poorest tenants while minimizing
shrinkage of the stock.
XVI. THE IMPACT OF THE WARRANTY ON GENTRIFICATION
Of course, filtering does not work for many other reasons than
milking. Note especially that increased demand from middle and
lower middle class consumers, who cannot afford to. build new
houses but can afford to increase their consumption of the existing
stock, can absorb all filtered units before any of them reach the
45. See generally Mandelker, Housing Codes, Building Demolition, and Just Compen-
sation, 67 MICH. L. REV. 635 (1969). On limited equity cooperatives, see Kirkpatrick, Limit-
ing the Equity in Housing Cooperatives: Choices and Tradeoffs, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
AND LAW CENTER REPORT, January/March 1981; Rocket, A Program for Community Owner-
ship of Residential Property (1982) (unpublished manuscript available at the Cooperative
Housing Task Force, Boston, Massachusetts); Newman, An Overview of the Low Income
Retained Equity Housing Cooperative Model, 8 LAW & HOUSING J. 21 (1980); Sanchez, Lim-
ited Equity Housing Cooperatives, A Case Study (1987) (unpublished note on file, Florida
State University Law Review).
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poor at the bottom of the chain. If the middle and upper classes
are increasing their shares of the pies of income and wealth rela-
tive to the poor (as they are at present), there is the distinct possi-
bility of reverse filtering, or gentrification. In this process, higher
income people bid for the buildings now occupied by the poor, dis-
placing some directly, and increasing rents for everyone.," Even in
this desperate situation, the warranty may be helpful.
One motive for milking may be speculative: The owner is betting
that the neighborhood will gentrify, and the cheapest way for him
to buy into that possibility is to buy a building and milk it. If a
speculator had to maintain any building held for possible gentrifi-
cation, the costs of converting a neighborhood and displacing its
older residents would be marginally higher than it is now. In other
words, middle and upper income renters, condominium owners,
and homeowners would have to pay marginally more and wait mar-
ginally longer before moving into their new premises, and the poor
could hold on a little longer in their old ones.
Note, though, that the time factor is crucial. Enforcement of the
warranty after a building is no longer viable will indeed cause the
owner to abandon it, since milking is irreversible. And enforcing
the warranty against a speculator who has bought expecting to be
able to milk may cause him to accelerate the gentrification process
by selling earlier than he would have had he been allowed to con-
tinue to milk. Enforcement will only work if it pushes up the ex
ante costs of the milking strategy, and it will do this only if poten-
tial milkers have a rational expectation that they will be sued or
prosecuted if they attempt it.
XVII. CONCLUSION
The problems of defining guidelines for identifying buildings
that are viable, of framing rules so that they are administrable,
and of choosing between public and private enforcement, or a com-
bination of the two, are all difficult.4 7 An experimental attempt at
serious code or warranty enforcement would have to face these
46. See Marcuse, Gentrification, Abandonment, and Displacement: Connections,
Causes, and Policy Responses in New York City, 28 WASH. U.J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 195
(1985). On the underlying demographic forces behind gentrification, see Alonso, The Popu-
lation Factor and Urban Structure, in THE PROSPECTIVE CITY 32 (A. Solomon ed. 1981).
47. On the institutional obstacles to enforcing the warranty through private actions, see
Lazerson, In the Halls of Justice, the Only Justice Is in the Halls, in 1 THE POLITICS OF
INFORMAL JUSTICE 119 (R. Abel ed. 1983); AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, JUSTICE EVICTED
(1987).
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problems, but I have nothing to say about them here. My argu-
ment has been that the "mainstream" analysis that would advise
against such an experiment is incomplete because it leaves out po-
tential supply-increasing effects of the warranty. Welfare econom-
ics does not, contrary to the mainstream view, suggest that the
warranty will hurt the poor. Rather, the impact of comprehensive
enforcement is indeterminate without detailed contextual analysis,
and there is no reason in principle why selective enforcement
should not reduce the price and increase the quantity of low in-
come housing.

